In 415 BC, the Athenian assembly debated whether to send a great expedition to conquer Sicily, at the far end of the known world. The Peloponnesian War against Sparta had already dragged on for years, and the plan was bold: to send an enormous fleet a long way from home to subdue Syracuse. Alcibiades, young and brilliant, championed the venture with promises of glory and riches. Nicias, a cautious and experienced general, opposed it.

What happened next is told by Thucydides, in his History of the Peloponnesian War, with an almost cruel irony. To dissuade the assembly, Nicias exaggerated the resources it would take: so many ships, so many men, so much money, to make them see the madness of the enterprise. But it had the opposite effect. Instead of being put off, the Athenians grew even more excited. If it takes that much, it must be worth it. The assembly, swept along by enthusiasm, voted to send a fleet even larger than the one anyone had proposed. The result would be one of the most complete catastrophes of antiquity: the fleet destroyed, thousands dead, and the survivors enslaved in the quarries of Syracuse. It was the beginning of the end for Athens.

The disaster was not decided in Sicily. It was decided in the assembly. By the time the fleet set sail, its fate was already sealed. What sank Athens was the conversation that preceded the expedition. That conversation shows every symptom of collective overconfidence: contagious enthusiasm, warnings that are given but in the wrong tone, and doubters who keep quiet because no one wants to be the one who puts the brakes on when everyone else is thrilled.

The useful lesson is not “don’t be bold”. It is understanding how a group talks itself into a decision it is no longer able to examine, and what mechanism can prevent it. One of them has a modern name: the premortem. It consists of imagining, before deciding, that a year has passed and the project has failed, and asking why. Nicias was essentially attempting something similar, but as the opposition. That is why it sounded like obstruction rather than analysis, and the assembly could dismiss him as the pessimist of the day.

In business, the Sicilian expedition is repeated every time a big bet (an acquisition, a move into a new market, an ambitious launch) is decided on a wave of enthusiasm. Whoever raises their hand to point out the risks is seen as the brake, and by the next meeting has fallen silent. The remedy is not to ban boldness, but to institutionalize doubt. Make the premortem a compulsory step, a role assigned to someone, so that questioning the decision is their job rather than an act of betrayal. Athens had no mechanism to separate ambition from analysis.

In our personal lives, our Sicilian expeditions are the momentous, hard-to-reverse decisions made at the height of excitement: changing your life overnight, a major purchase, dropping everything for a project. Here, enthusiasm is something to be wary of precisely because it feels good. It is worth asking what your future self, looking back on a failure a year from now, would point to. And sleeping on it. A night’s sleep usually turns down the siren song of enthusiasm just enough.

When it comes to learning, we have an advantage Athens did not: we can study its disaster without paying for it. History is a cheap simulation. Learning from the Sicilian expedition means we do not have to repeat it in order to understand it. The Athenians have already paid the price. Doing a postmortem on other people’s mistakes, and on our own, is how we accumulate judgment without having to lose a fleet each time.

We should not idealize caution, though. A premortem is not paralysis, and too much caution is as deadly as overconfidence. In fact, the bitterest twist in the story proves it. When the situation was already desperate and it was time to retreat, an eclipse of the moon frightened the superstitious Nicias, who delayed the withdrawal for almost a month on the advice of the soothsayers. That paralyzed caution turned a defeat into an annihilation. Doubt does not always save you. Deciding without examining and examining without ever deciding are two sides of the same mistake. What saves you is well-calibrated confidence.

This week’s exercise. Choose a decision that genuinely excites you right now. On a sheet of paper, write this sentence as if it were already true: “A year has passed and this has gone badly.” Underneath, note three plausible causes of the failure, without censoring yourself. Then ask yourself the question Athens never asked: who around you would have seen these causes coming – and have you silenced them, or did they fall silent on their own because you were all too excited?

In the decision that excites you most right now, who is your Nicias? Are you listening to them, or just waiting for them to get out of the way?

Sapere aude.