Daniel Kahneman won a Nobel Prize in Economics without being an economist. He was a psychologist, and what he showed, together with Amos Tversky, is that people do not make decisions the way classical economic theory assumed. We are not rational calculators coldly weighing up costs and benefits. We are something else: faster, keen to save effort and systematically biased.
The mind, he said, works as if it had two systems. System 1 is fast, automatic and intuitive. It recognizes a face, swerves to avoid a car and tells you what two plus two makes without any effort. System 2 is slow, deliberate and effortful. It is the one we use to multiply seventeen by twenty-four or fill in a tax return. They are not two areas of the brain, just a way of naming two modes of thinking – and the problem is that the fast mode makes far more of our decisions than we think, including when it should not.
This is where biases come from, and they are well documented. There are quite a few of them. Anchoring means that the first figure we hear shapes the whole negotiation that follows. Loss aversion means that losing a hundred euros hurts more than winning a hundred feels good. Overconfidence leads us to set deadlines and budgets that are almost never met. These are not the failings of unintelligent people. Kahneman insisted that, after a lifetime of studying biases, he was not much better at avoiding them than anyone else.
Knowing about biases does not make us immune to them. Knowing what anchoring is does not stop you from being anchored. That is why Kahneman’s useful conclusion is not “distrust your intuition”, which would also be bad advice. Intuition works very well in predictable environments where we have had time to learn the rules, as an A&E doctor or an experienced firefighter has. It fails in noisy environments where situations rarely repeat themselves, such as predicting the stock market or whether a new hire will succeed. You need to know which kind of pitch you are playing on.
One bias does particular harm in organizations: what Kahneman called the illusion of validity. We tend to trust our judgments far more than their accuracy warrants, especially when we can tell a story that fits the data in front of us. The trouble is that a coherent story is not necessarily a true one; it simply makes us feel certain. A well-told business plan convinces even when its premises are fragile, and the smoother it sounds, the less we question it.
In business, this has a practical consequence. Since you cannot correct biases with willpower, you have to correct them with procedure. Decide the criteria for a hire before you see the candidates, so that a charming first interview does not sweep everything else aside. Ask for proposals separately before the meeting, so that whoever speaks first does not anchor everyone else. The bias does not go away. It is neutralized by the way the decision is set up.
This week’s exercise. Before your next important decision, do a premortem on a sheet of paper (read last week’s article). Imagine that a year has passed and the decision has gone badly. Write the story of why it failed by hand, in as much detail as you can. This small exercise forces System 2 into action and brings to light the risks that the excitement of the moment was hiding.
Kahneman was not asking us to stop trusting ourselves, but to know when we can. In the decision in front of you, is your instinct speaking from genuine experience, or from your wish for things to turn out well?
Sapere aude.

